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ABSTRACT 
Professional and lay explanations of disability, collected via interviews and participant 
observation during fieldwork in Hyderabad, South India, identify ‘carelessness’ and 
‘superstition’ as major impediments to good health among the general population, and 
education as the key solution.  In that such findings suggest a valorisation of personal 
responsibility for self-care, the Foucauldian concept of biopower appeared a salient 
framework for analysis. While illuminating, however, biopower was ultimately inadequate for 
explaining what emerged, on closer analysis, as significant discrepancies between 
assumptions about how disabled people engaged with healthcare services and their actual 
beliefs and practices; and between the moral interpretations different stakeholders made of 
‘carelessness’ in describing perceived causes of disability. My data also suggested that 
education was not in itself a key determinant in people’s healthcare decisions. This article 
explores these differences between official and demotic discourses concerning the causes of 
disability and attempts to account for them ethnographically.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Officially sanctioned categorisations of ‘disability’ in India, I argue in this article, are at least 
partially constituted by dominant ‘discourses of truth’ (Foucault 1994:31), biomedicine 
among them, with disability framed as a public health issue to be addressed through 
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medically-informed interventions. These interventions are in turn validated and enabled 
through public health education and campaigns – sponsored by NGOs, the state and 
international medical organisations – that locate responsibility for negatively construed bodily 
differences in the affected individual and his or her family. This framing informs and 
naturalises decisions taken about, for example, treatment and rehabilitation of those socially 
constituted as ‘the disabled’. It also defines, within tight constraints, the very terms within 
which ‘disability’ – long since exposed by Disability Studies (DS) scholars as a fluid social 
category rather than an objective medical one (Barnes and Mercer 2003; Shakespeare 2006; 
Shuttleworth and Kasnitz 2004; Thomas & Corker 2002; Tremain 2002; Staples 2011) – may 
be imagined and acted upon. This has implications for how families make decisions 
concerning the relative social worth of those of its members whose bodies are configured or 
perform differently to the mainstream.  
In addition to analysing how, why and the extent to which disabled people in South 
India are constituted as personally responsible for their bodily conditions, I also identify 
alternatives to this position, in doing so questioning whether official medical discourses are as 
dominant as they at first appear in structuring how people constituted, understood, and 
subsequently responded to disability and disabled people. While, on the one hand, biopolitics 
over-determines official rhetoric and policy concerning disability, in so doing shaping and 
constraining its public discussion, on the other hand, this rhetoric masks alternative discourses 
that might better reflect quotidian experiences of disability. In this article I attempt to draw 
out these different levels of interpretation and to chart their interplay. I also consider the 
practical implications of a rhetoric rooted in the biopower model for public health responses 
to disability.  
 
Fieldsites and Methodology 
 3 
My fieldwork in Hyderabad, South India (September 2005-December 2006), explored how 
disability – described locally as vikalangumu (Telugu) and vikalang (Hindu) – was 
constituted as a social category encompassing various negatively construed bodily 
differences. I conducted research, with a local research assistant, in multiple locations: in 
hospitals; in disabled people’s homes; in public places; in disability activists’ offices; in a 
small settlement of disabled people on the peripheries of the city; and at public meetings and 
NGO workshops. Informants were drawn from across socio-economic divides: from upper-
middle class families who could afford to attend a neurosurgeon’s private clinic to those 
begging for their living on the streets. They were also broadly representative in terms of age, 
gender, and the communal make-up of the city (predominantly Hindu but with a large Muslim 
minority).   
My initial intention was to limit my focus to bodily differences caused by particular 
conditions. To this end I undertook interviews with 100 families whose children had been 
diagnosed with cerebral palsy and with 82 sight-impaired people, recruited at out-patient 
clinics or during field visits with social workers and paramedics. On the ground, however, 
such distinctions were significantly blurred: many organisations I spent time with worked 
across impairment categories; my own categories were not mutually exclusive; and people 
defined by those around them as disabled often identified themselves more generally than my 
limiting categorisations allowed. The majority of self-identified disabled people I met 
described their impairments in relation to what their bodies could or could not do rather than 
in terms of a named condition. There was also the broader epistemological problem that in 
identifying particular conditions as disabilities or impairments I was reifying abstract, 
contextually-defined categories. Accepting that both disability and impairment, as identified 
by DS scholars, are as socially and environmentally constructed as they are descriptors of 
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individual conditions, I consequently came to focus on the more general problematic of how 
and when notions of ‘disability’ were invoked, and tried to analyse why.  
This article draws on observations and conversations in the contexts described above, 
and on in-depth, open-ended interviews with people I met in them. In addition to those who 
defined themselves, or were defined by others, as disabled, I also interviewed and spent time 
with doctors and other healthcare professionals; disability activists; parents, siblings and 
carers of disabled people; and charity workers involved in rehabilitation. The institutional 
perspectives of health professionals identified as a consequence of those encounters are a 
particular focus of this article. Specifically, I worked with doctors, rehabilitation specialists 
and physiotherapists in three regular out-patient clinics – one dealing with cerebral palsy and 
related cases; one in managing the practical effects of sight-impairments; and the third a 
private paediatric clinic for children with various physical impairments. In each of these 
contexts, as well as observing the clinics as they took place and arranging to interview 
patients separately, I also spoke to the health professionals between patients, and, later, 
conducted more formal interviews with several of them. I also accompanied paramedics from 
the first two hospitals when they went to visit patients at home, and observed and spoke with 
similar professionals in several rehabilitation centres as they went about their daily work. 
Since ‘disability’ is constituted at least as much by ‘outsiders’ as from within, 
however, I also worked with the lay public. In Hyderabad, this meant noting what those I met 
– local shopkeepers and street traders, auto rickshaw drivers, students, teachers, municipal 
officials, and fellow customers at tea stands and snack kiosks – had to say about the issues I 
was exploring. In the provincial town adjacent to where I conducted earlier fieldwork in 
coastal Andhra Pradesh (see Staples 2007a) – which I visited several times during my 
Hyderabad fieldwork – I discussed the same topics with a similar range of people, including 
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farmers and field labourers. In doing so I amassed a total of 60 semi-structured interviews, 
and notes on many more casual conversations.  
Public perspectives on disability, this data suggests, mirror the same Foucauldian 
biopolitics that shaped dominant professional and official discourses. From both perspectives, 
responsibility for causing disability appeared to be located in individuals and their families. 
However, prolonged encounters with lay and disabled people in Hyderabad served 
significantly to nuance my interview data, suggesting not just differences between medical 
and lay opinion – hardly unexpected – but between opinions and practices widely attributed to 
the lay public through official discourses, and those which emerged through my ethnographic 
analysis. 
 
Situating the research problem 
According to Rabinow and Rose (1994), drawing on Foucault (1978), biopower is the 
capacity of the state to control what were once considered the subjective, private concerns of 
citizens: activities such as the care and management of one’s body and, consequently, life 
itself. This is achieved not through coercion but through the propagation of dominant truth 
discourses – about, for example, health – which foreclose alternative ideologies and constrain 
populations to think and behave within particular parameters (Rose 1990:ix; Rabinow and 
Rose 1994; Rose 2007). Biopower, as Rose identifies, has been scaled-down from a ‘bio-
politics of populations’ (Foucault 1978:139) to self-management by ‘newly responsibilized 
individuals and smaller groups’ (Hannah 2011:1040). If successfully executed, then, 
particular bodily conditions or deviations from the average can be negatively re-categorised as 
pathological and, by reference to an imperative for self-care, those affected or those close to 
them can be held responsible for their own conditions. This culpability is further compounded 
if what are considered to be the appropriate steps to seek cure or correction are not taken. 
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‘Every citizen,’ as Rose expresses it, ‘must now become an active partner in the drive for 
health, accepting their responsibility for securing their own well-being’ (2007:63). Being ill 
or disabled within such a dominant worldview is not just the ‘personal tragedy’ that medical 
models of disability have been accused of reducing it to (Oliver 1990); rather, choices taken 
by the ill and the disabled and their families are seen as causing their bodily conditions.  
When such positions become naturalised through the kind of dominant truth 
discourses Foucault describes, institutional responses to negatively construed bodily 
conditions might logically be framed in terms of education and in changing the ways of 
marginalized groups rather than making the wider structural changes – such as redistribution 
of wealth – that alternative explanations of disability might promote. So, while some might 
draw attention to the life affirming qualities of biopolitics as forms of power aimed at valuing 
and supporting life (Hannah 2010), it also, in its microforms, shifts responsibility from the 
state and culpable institutions on to the individual targets of medical interventions and 
rehabilitation.  As I shall discuss, it might also account for why public health education 
programmes have such a low rate of success 
In that a high proportion of the conversations I had with medical professionals about 
disability in Hyderabad referenced a discourse that cited careless or reckless behaviours, a 
lack of education and an enchantment with tradition as the predominant causes of disability, 
academic discussions of biopower and biopolitics clearly offered a useful initial frame for 
understanding the wider contexts that informed such discourses, hence aiding our 
understanding of lay notions of culpability, and of state and institutional measures to manage 
disability. That those same medical professionals related ignorance and carelessness to 
‘cultural beliefs’ (Link & Phelan et al 1999:1328) also references a much wider discussion 
within public health that goes beyond India. Writing in the mid-1950s about mental health, 
for example, Shirley Star argued that in order for patients to be treated successfully, a 
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‘veritable revolution in people’s ideas about some very fundamental questions’ was required 
(1955, cited Link & Phelan et al 1999:1331). Lay beliefs about mental illness, like the lay 
beliefs several of the healthcare professionals I worked with alluded to, were seen as a 
fundamental barrier to good health. While Link and Phelan et al’s (1999) later research 
suggests a narrowing of the gulf between lay and professional conceptions, others have 
identified a continuing and widespread connection drawn by health professionals and 
researchers between ‘culture’ – as a euphemism for negatively-construed difference – and the 
spread of disease (Saethre and Stadler 2009) or ‘bad behaviour’ more generally (Volpp 2000). 
Leach and Fairhead (2007), for example, document how ignorance, a lack of education and 
the persistence of ‘traditional’ ideas are also assumed to be barriers to medical interventions 
in West Africa, while Geffen (2005, cited in Niehaus 2009) likewise frames treatment 
programmes as a battle of ‘science’ over ‘ignorance’.  Given discrepancies between what are 
attributed to people as their ‘cultural beliefs’ and the beliefs to which they lay claim – 
suggested both by the authors cited above and through my own fieldwork – the link drawn 
between culture and disability, with education cited as its antidote, requires further attention. 
At the same time, however, while Foucauldian analyses imply increasing levels of 
self-surveillance and acceptance of personal or familial responsibility for ensuring one’s 
health as moral imperatives, the extent to which my informants outside professional contexts 
– and especially those towards the bottom of the social hierarchy – fully situated themselves 
within this worldview is questionable. As Marsland and Prince argue in the introduction to 
this collection, self-care techniques are often unavailable to those anthropologists work with. 
Rather, as several commentators note (Braun 2007; Cheah 2007; Hannah 2011), while such 
forms of biopolitics might be salient in ‘zones of liberal peace’ (Braun 2007:25) in the 
relatively affluent West, the relocation of responsibility for management of the body to the 
self is less all-encompassing and less stable in the global South and, more generally, among 
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women and lower socio-economic groups. While biopolitics clearly informs the rhetoric 
available for public framing of disability in India, then, my data suggest that it does not 
penetrate sufficiently deeply to serve as a single source of interpretation. Indeed, as I will 
show, people’s lived experiences and behaviours often served as a direct challenge to the 
rhetoric of their first level comments and observations.  
In the next section, I begin with a synthesis of the arguments most commonly made 
among the health professionals I worked with in accounting for disability. 
 
Three assumptions about disability and disabled people in South India 
Health professionals are not an undifferentiated mass, and my distillation of the dominant 
perspectives I summarise here draws on research in specifically clinical settings, rather than 
the more informal contexts in which I met my lay informants. Nevertheless, there were 
recurrent narratives that ran through my contacts with the professional group. The first of 
these is that many disabled people, and especially those from rural, uneducated and 
economically poor backgrounds, do not obtain suitable treatment for their bodily conditions. 
This is because a) they do not understand the nature of those conditions or realize they might 
be relieved or cured by biomedical intervention; and b) they are enthralled to superstition and 
traditional, unscientific methods of cure with few if any curative benefits. The paediatrician I 
worked with, for example, regularly commented of patients that their parents had wasted time 
in treating them with ineffective ‘tree medicine’ (local, plant-based cures) and the remedies of 
‘quacks and charlatans’. The neurosurgeon whose clinic I attended likewise blamed 
uneducated people’s unwillingness to come to the hospital until hopes pinned upon sacrifices 
and prayers to particular gods and goddesses, or pilgrimages to sacred sites where they could 
appeal for a cure for their conditions, had been exhausted.  
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A second, related, assumption is that many conditions are caused or made worse not 
only by a failure to access biomedical resources, but because of what was glossed, usually in 
English, as ‘carelessness’. In more than half of my interviews with the lay public, as I shall 
expand upon later, respondents also answered questions about causes of disability with 
references to ‘carelessness’, the English word, or its Telugu equivalent, niralakshanam: 
phrases glossing a variety of meanings, but which suggest that people should have known 
better and could, by implication, have avoided their conditions. The medical professionals I 
worked with used the same notion to cover both preventable accidents—such as crashing a 
car or injuring oneself—and, more abstractly, to a lack of attention to moral codes. On the one 
hand, doctors I interviewed uniformly dismissed direct correlations between immoral 
behaviour and negatively-construed bodily differences as a feature of the superstition or 
‘culture’ which they said stalled public health progress. They all said that people were wrong, 
for example, to attribute impairments to karma – deeds in former lives to which their current 
situation was a response. The neurosurgeon would comment to me regularly between patients 
on how rural/village/uneducated people (categories he used almost inter-changeably) would 
‘make sacrifices to this or that goddess’ to atone for whatever behaviour had led to their 
current misfortune, and needed to be re-trained in more scientific explanations that would, in 
turn, cause them to seek biomedical care much earlier than they did at present. ‘It is very 
difficult to explain to people the facts of their conditions,’ concurred the paediatrician, 
speaking to me directly after a consultation with migrant labourers, who were concerned that 
their daughter could still not walk at the age of three years. ‘They are ignorant, uneducated, 
will think about it being their fate rather than caused by a medical condition, so they might 
not even come forward for treatment, or will only come late.’ On the other hand, several 
doctors I interviewed also drew implicit correlations between the fecklessness of some of 
their patients and their impairments: a moral depravity embodied in poor dietary choices; bad 
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habits such as smoking, extra-marital sex and alcohol consumption; marriage to close 
relatives; and poor personal care. In the case of the migrant workers’ daughter, for example, 
the doctor felt that the family’s itinerant lifestyle – which included, he assumed, leaving the 
girl to play unattended at the roadside while her parents worked – had caused them not even 
to notice obvious health problems and to do nothing for a long time when they did. ‘You see, 
they develop bad ways of doing things,’ as the neurosurgeon put it in respect of his own 
patients from comparable backgrounds. ‘They don’t know it’s wrong to do some of the things 
that we understand as improper – they’ve been brought up like that, it’s what they see around 
them in the slums and the villages.’  
The benign take on this assumption, and the one taken by all the medical professionals 
I encountered who expressed an opinion, was that people were unaware of how to care for 
themselves or their children, and so needed education and other forms of state intervention. A 
harsher reading, expressed by a few doctors and rehabilitation professionals in respect of 
particular patients, was that people were simply reckless with their health, taking unnecessary 
risks and then not visiting the doctor even when affordable care was available.  
A third assumption follows from the first two: that is, that increased biomedical 
knowledge, imparted through health education programmes, will decrease the incidence of 
disability because people will learn to take preventative measures, and decrease suffering 
caused by disability because people will be able to seek appropriate treatments. The 
neurosurgeon, in particular, was keen to enlist me in his campaign for the government to 
spend more on public health education campaigns – pushing me to discover the ‘cultural 
beliefs’ that prevented people from responding appropriately to their conditions so that 
education could be addressed to specific problems – but all of my professional informants 
saw education as at least part of the solution to disabling conditions.  
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All three of these broad assumptions, I argue, mask more complex lived realities. 
More significantly, they also locate causality of disease or disability firmly within the 
individual, family or social group concerned, rather than, for example, within wider economic 
and political conditions or state policies, which is where ‘social models’ of disability (see, 
e.g., Oliver 1990) would locate it.  
 
Lay perceptions about disability 
Given that public attitudes are shaped in important ways by the same discourses within which 
my professional informants positioned themselves, it is unsurprising that lay views on 
disability frequently bought into the same kind of assumptions. ‘Carelessness’ – both the 
English word and its Telugu equivalent – came up regularly, across social boundaries, in 
discussions about causality, and, although used loosely to gloss over what transpired to be a 
range of different perspectives or, sometimes, to avoid a more specific explanation, the term 
was generally used to locate cause in the disabled person or their carers. ‘Carelessness’ – 
because, as several people expanded, ‘they don’t know any better’ – was also seen as 
something that could be challenged by education. ‘People neglect to go to the doctors and to 
the hospitals,’ one farm labourer – a low caste [1] 35-year-old man – told me in an interview, 
‘even when free care is available, as it is in the Government hospitals.’ A small group of 
urban middle class under-graduate arts students I was chatting to at a teashop expressed 
similar views, nodding in agreement at one of their group’s suggestion, in English, that ‘being 
backward in education and having a low level of awareness… are the key issues in people 
being handicapped.’ Backwardness – a term in common, official usage in relation, for 
example, to ‘backward castes’ [2]– was used a great deal in discussions with my lay 
informants about disability, especially when I questioned them about causality. It was 
sometimes used in specific relation to people being ‘economically backward’: a euphemism 
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for poverty, which also implicitly laid culpability for poverty on the poor, or inferred that the 
solution to their predicament lay in their own development rather than in wider external 
changes. ‘Backwardness’ was also used in a more general way. Mirroring the narratives I 
found among health professionals, one shopkeeper told me that those most likely to be 
disabled were ‘the backward, the poor, the uneducated, and those who don’t take proper care 
of their own lives.’  
 The most explicit example of laying culpability for impairments on disabled people 
themselves was from the caretaker of the building where I lived, a Hindu man from a mid-
ranking caste, in his late 60s. Those most likely to suffer disabilities, he told me in an 
interview, were those with ‘bad habits’, especially men who slept with ‘bad women’. Another 
informant, too, identified ‘the criminally minded’ as the most likely to suffer impairments, not 
because of any kind of divine intervention (although karma was occasionally invoked as an 
explanation) but because not playing by the rules laid one more susceptible to accidents. 
Although other responses tended to be more temperate, many saw personal irresponsibility or 
recklessness as a central cause of impairments – a position which, at least on the surface, 
seems to mirror lay perspectives on negatively construed categories of ill-health in other parts 
of the world (e.g., Link and Phelan et al 1999). A high caste female lecturer from a college in 
the city, for instance, said those most likely to have disabled family members were ‘people 
who don’t take the birth of a child as a major responsibility and who don’t visit doctors 
frequently during pregnancy. They are more likely to give birth to children with disabilities.’  
As well as taking responsibility for themselves, it was also considered important by 
these informants that disabled people remained as independent as possible. ‘I strictly never 
give to any disabled person begging,’ said the college lecturer. ‘I feel it is encouraging them 
even more to be dependant.’ While most others claimed they were more likely to give money 
to disabled people begging than to others – because it was harder for the former to work – 
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many, particularly those educated to degree-level and above, felt that employment was a 
better solution to meeting disabled people’s needs. ‘It’s better to work, no?’ said a teacher at a 
Hyderabad nursery school, ‘because that way they can learn to help themselves. And if we 
have to give, it’s better to give things like food, otherwise there’s a danger they’ll just spend it 
on drugs and alcohol.’ 
 In expressing such opinions, my lay interviewees also expressed a particular fear of 
the ‘other’ against whom they attempted to contrast themselves, even when they, too, came 
from socially marginalized groups. Self-control, proper care of one’s body, and independence, 
were, in line with a Foucauldian analysis of the kind outlined above, values to be propagated 
(see Ecks 2004). Indeed, the prospect that they or their children might also become disabled if 
they did not conduct themselves appropriately helped to ensure a form of self-surveillance, 
particularly among middle class informants.  
This potent mingling of fear and disgust in response to bodily impairment was 
palpable in the reaction from one high caste and apparently wealthy woman we met in the 
waiting room of the eye hospital one morning. My research assistant and I had been talking to 
an older woman seated across the room from her, who had accompanied her 18 year old 
grandson to the hospital in the hope of getting him treatment for sight impairments that 
prevented him from bringing any income into the household. They were clearly very poor. 
Neither the grandmother nor her grandson wore shoes and both were shabbily dressed. They 
had travelled the hundred miles or so from their village, she said, because they had heard of 
someone else successfully getting treatment from the hospital, and if the same could happen 
for her grandson, he could join her working as a casual farm labourer. The boy’s mother, she 
said in Hindi, had died when he was very small and, unwanted by other family members 
because of his sight impairment, had been left in her care. The other woman in the waiting 
room – whose well-maintained, Bengali silk sari-clad and fair-skinned body stood in sharp 
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contrast to that of our interviewee – interrupted her story at this point, turning to me and 
exclaiming, in English, with her eyebrows raised in alarm: ‘Why do they wait until now to 
come!? When he’s grown up already! These people don’t take proper responsibility!’ She 
shook her head despairingly and returned to her magazine. Had they come earlier to the 
hospital, she inferred, the young man might have been cured. Despite the wider circumstances 
at play – extreme poverty and livelihood pressures, a lack of locally accessible medical care, 
and family ties stretched by the death of the boy’s mother, culpability for his condition was 
turned back on to his family.
 
  
 With the ‘careless’ seen as posing a risk not only to themselves but also to others 
around them, then, the disabled are constituted as morally questionable. Here, cosmopolitan 
neo-liberal ideas about individual responsibility and autonomy meet with the remnants of 
much older, evolutionary notions of the kind once used to justify colonialism, as well as more 
localized notions about charity. Just as so-constructed ‘primitive’ peoples were constituted as 
‘white man’s burden’ – saved and improved by their colonization – the contemporary failure 
of socially-excluded groups within India to fulfil their duty of care to themselves and their 
families justified the intrusion of the State and the medical establishment into the way they 
managed their day-to-day lives.  
 
Alternative discourses 
Despite an apparent uniformity of opinion across medical and lay discourses, in the same way 
that colonial authority was never a ‘totalized terrain’ (Dube 2004:10), neither does the 
biopower of the Foucauldian imagination entirely encompass how impairments are 
understood on the ground, its very taken-for-grantedness allowing alternative discourses to 
flourish unremarked. The generalized ‘carelessness’ that lay people spoke of was not always 
considered to be only about ignorance, illiteracy and a ‘lack of awareness’, even though 
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elements of these causes lingered in nearly all my respondents’ accounts, and offered the 
dominant, first-level explanations. When I pressed interviewees to elaborate on why disabled 
people had been careless, for example, a common theme, across socio-economic, age and 
gender groups, was that they were negligent about their own care because they had to live in 
unhygienic conditions: in close-together and cramped slum dwellings without plumbed 
sanitation, which provided little protection from the elements and allowed the spread of 
disease to go on unhindered. In this sense, although disability was still blamed on neglect, its 
victims often lacked the agency to avoid such neglect. Disabled people were also seen as 
likely to be poor, unable to access or afford adequate treatment. Although, again, dominant 
‘discourses of truth’ depoliticize poverty by relating it to individual or personal development, 
well over half of my 60 lay informants seemed to recognize, at least implicitly, that more 
structural factors were also at play. ‘The poor have no knowledge of medical care and also 
have to spend all their time working to make enough just to live, so they naturally neglect 
their health,’ as an engineering student I interviewed at a roadside tea stall put it, succinctly 
making the point that those on the breadline – like the grandmother and grandson described 
above – had more pressing concerns than visits to the doctor.  
Another family I spent time with over a longer period, in this case in the settlement of 
physically disabled people on the borders of the city that I visited two or three times a month, 
were a good illustration of this point. Their daughter, who was affected by polio and could not 
walk, had been given some initial allopathic treatment. However, her mother said it had been 
difficult to find the time or resources to give more, particularly when she believed, in 
accordance with medical opinion, that nothing would restore her daughter’s ability to walk. 
For one thing, their peripheral geographical location, far from transport links, mitigated 
against visits to hospitals. For another, the mother was reliant on casual, daily waged labour 
stuffing mattresses to supplement her husband’s meagre income from local begging, a poorly 
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remunerated task which took up most of the time she was not directly engaged in her now 
teenaged daughter’s care. So, while people did cite ‘carelessness’ – in the less accusatory 
sense of an absence of care than a wilful recklessness – to explain why people like this 
woman’s daughter contracted polio in the first place, they also recognized, when pressed, that 
money and/or access to treatment were also important. 
 In addition, what also became apparent as I got to know some of my lay informants 
better, was that their stated views about disability were frequently strongly at odds with their 
relationships with actual disabled people. Shariff, for example, was an elderly Shia Muslim 
man who lived close to my apartment. He had handed the running of his shop over to his 
nephew and now spent much of his day sitting in the street with his friends and watching 
passers-by. People’s lack of care for their own health was a theme he returned to often 
whenever we discussed disability, the impairments which resulted from such neglect seen as a 
major hurdle in the development of the country as a whole. People needed to take better 
responsibility for themselves and for their own actions, he said. 
 Despite this outwardly rigid, negative stance about disabled people, over the ensuing 
months Shariff would regularly call me over to introduce disabled friends. Nearly all of them, 
like him, were urban, middle class Muslims who had run small businesses, and all of them – 
unlike Shariff – sported a range of bodily differences that distinguished them from the 
mainstream. None of them fitted the stereotypes of disabled people he had described 
previously, and none of them were presented as being personally culpable. Their impairments, 
in his view, had been a consequence of kismet – luck; ‘Allah’s will’; and/or accidents beyond 
the control of the individual concerned. Likewise, Mohammed, a local shoe-trader in his mid-
50s, initially blamed the high incidence of disability among the poor on the fact that they sent 
their children out to work rather than to school. As a result, he told me disapprovingly when I 
questioned him one day at the roadside, ‘they have a lack of awareness and their behaviour is 
 17 
often reckless.’ Further probing in the weeks that followed, however, revealed that 
Mohammed’s own younger brother had been impaired by a workplace accident – leaving him 
reliant on a cane to walk – and that one of his closest friends, a guard at a nearby ATM 
machine, had lost the use of his arm ‘through paralysis.’ More wistful now than censorious, 
he told me: ‘Like other poor people, they just didn’t have the money or the contacts to get the 
right kind of treatment when they needed it, so what could they do? Even if someone does 
manage to get together the money, who has the time to go from this clinic to that clinic when 
you have a family to feed?’ 
 The discrepancy between Shariff and Mohammed’s abstract views and those they 
expressed in relation to particular individuals were particularly marked, but were by no means 
unique and, among those I got to know quite well, these disjunctures soon became evident in 
my records of our conversations. In part this was because known disabled people did not 
represent the ‘other’ in the ways that abstract conceptions of ‘the disabled’ did. The 
discrepancy also arose for at least two further reasons. First, there is a well-documented 
tendency for respondents to give answers they believe the interviewer wants to hear or which 
might benefit them
 
[5] (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995:126-133). Second, when people were 
asked standardized questions, they responded with ready-made answers that required minimal 
reflection, and which belied the more nuanced perspectives that emerged through 
conversations over time. In short, the effects of biopower helped to account for first level and 
official explanations of disability, but masked interpretations shaped by everyday experience.  
 
Challenging assumptions 
While the above has shown that official discourses about disability are not as smoothly 
internalized by the lay population as my data originally seemed to suggest, my more direct 
fieldwork with disabled people and their families additionally indicates significant flaws in 
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interpreting responses to disability solely as examples of biopower, an explanatory frame that 
offers very limited perspectives on quotidian realities in Hyderabad.  
 Firstly, my wider research with disabled recipients of medical attention suggested 
there was no significant attribution of cause or potential cure to ‘the goddess’ or to 
‘superstition’, despite nearly all the medical professionals I worked with claiming that their 
patients from rural areas and urban slums interpreted their conditions in this way. In the case 
of the families affected by cerebral palsy, more than half of my respondents (59 per cent) – 
from across social and religious divides – identified specific medically-recognized causes. 
Although causes doctors would classify as non-medical were sometimes mentioned, such as 
disability as a consequence of misdemeanours in a previous life, these explanations did not 
exclude medical ones. As elsewhere, people held poly-ontological beliefs (Scott 2007). 
Lakshmi, for example, was the middle-class mother of Shanti, a nine-year-old girl severely 
affected by cerebral palsy. On the one hand, she was well-versed in medical explanations of 
her condition and utilised various prescribed drugs and treatments – on which she could speak 
authoritatively – to help alleviate her daughter’s suffering and improve her day-to-day 
condition. On the other hand, she was equally certain that conducting special pujas (Hindu 
religious rituals) and pilgrimages were key to improving Shanti’s condition. ‘I heard the 
words of Amma
 
[a spiritual leader] in my ear, calling us to see her in Kolkata, so we went 
there,’ she told me during an in-depth interview at my apartment. ‘I’ve also been advised to 
do 500,000 of mantras
 
[religious chants]. So far I’ve managed 90,000 in one sitting. If I 
manage to achieve at least a 100,000 I think she might also start to walk. I have a lot of faith, 
a lot of belief in puja. We need to give to God so God will give to us.’ 
    In many cases, explanations also represented conventionalized ways of responding to 
my questions. ‘Sometimes we’ll ask, “What sins did we commit for something like to 
happen?”’ as the mother of Gopal, a sight-impaired boy with learning-difficulties, explained it 
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to me when I met her in the waiting room of the eye hospital. ‘But these are just words, we 
don’t really think in that way. It’s just what people say. It just means we don’t know how to 
explain it, so we say that it was God’s will.’ Such commentary also highlights difficulties in 
interpreting the results of highly-structured public health research, such as the vignette 
method adopted by Link and Phelan et al (1999), which offer little potential for probing why 
informants respond to questions in the ways that they do. 
 What is also interesting here is that the lower caste, economically poor families I 
spoke to were less likely than their higher caste counterparts – who, by and large, were 
formally educated to a higher level and economically wealthier – to attribute their conditions 
to ‘superstition,’ despite the prevalent view among health care professionals that it was the 
poor who were most in need of health education. The explanation given by Gopal’s mother – 
who was a daily-waged farm labourer from what the Government classifies as a Scheduled 
Tribe (ST) – was fairly typical of families in a similar position. They were not necessarily 
medically well informed, but had faith in medical science to help them, if only they could 
access it. When karmic causes of disability were discussed and related to action, such as 
pilgrimages and acts of obeisance to particular Gods, it was usually among my high caste, 
largely affluent, Hindu informants, for whom religion also played a more central part in their 
reasoning.
 
These families were also more likely to seek additional treatments to those 
prescribed, such as Ayurvedic massage for some children with cerebral palsy, which the 
neurosurgeon I worked with identified as particularly harmful in those cases. Lakshmi, the 
mother whose poly-ontological beliefs I cited earlier, was an exemplar of this kind of patient: 
while poorer, less educated patients appeared content to go along with whatever the doctor 
recommended, their wealthier, more educated counterparts were more likely to take a critical 
approach to medical recommendations. In Lakshmi’s case, this led her to dismiss some of the 
neurosurgeon’s advice, also incorporating Ayurveda, rituals, pilgrimages and physiotherapy 
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into her daughter’s treatment regime. Even among my wealthier middle-class informants, 
however, both cause and subsequent treatment tended, at least in interviews with me, to be 
framed in biomedical terms, and informants nearly always included reference to allopathic 
doctors alongside other strategies. 
 Mohammad’s story is a good example of this. A 50-year-old unmarried Sunni Muslim 
man from an economically poor background, Mohammad had lost the use of both his legs, 
and got around on a Government-scheme sponsored tricycle. I met him at the community of 
disabled people, where he worked embroidering saris and salwar kameez on a commission 
basis. When he had developed ‘a tumour’ on one of his legs as a child, his parents took him 
‘to so many hospitals and other places.’ A fever, combined with cold weather, was suggested 
as a possible cause, and their response was to seek out whatever help might be available. He 
told me: 
 
Yes, we visited mosques and shrines. We had tonics and pills prescribed by the doctor 
and, when they didn’t work, we also used Ayurvedic medicine. My grandmother 
drained the blood from a pigeon, mixed it with biryani oil and applied it to my legs, 
but it didn’t seem to make any difference. There were lots of other treatments too, but 
here I am. What Allah gave me, He gave. I am God’s creation.’ 
 
What was striking here and in nearly all the accounts I heard was that people did not, as 
medical discourse implied, choose local or alternative medicines over biomedicine: rather – 
and particularly in cases where biomedicine did not offer a cure – they tried whatever was at 
hand. And although the final sentence of Mohammad’s quote suggests an acceptance of his 
bodily status quo, his earlier words belie a straightforward or fatalistic acceptance. For him 
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and for nearly all of those I worked with, acceptance, if it came at all, came at the end of a 
long journey of treatments from a wide range of sources. 
 While disabled people and their families were, then, generally more receptive to 
biomedical treatments than popular and official discourses proposed, what my fieldwork also 
demonstrated was that cause was not, in any case, as straightforwardly biological as a 
biomedical explanatory model suggests. Several of those I met in the eye hospital – 
particularly those from poorer backgrounds, for whom treatment was potentially free – 
suffered from conditions that had been specifically caused by industrial accidents or were a 
consequence of poor living conditions. A stone-breaker who had been permanently blinded 
(and facially disfigured) by an exploding kerosene stove that he was lighting to heat water for 
tea, for example, might not have been injured had he had access to a gas ring or had the 
kerosene stove been in a better state of repair. Deprivation – or what Farmer called ‘structural 
violence’ (2005) – set the scene for what happened. Disability is not only about individual 
‘carelessness’ or a reluctance to obtain medical treatment; it can also be directly caused by 
poverty and the particular circumstances within which one is located (Harriss-White 
1999:140). 
 Medical interventions themselves were also identified by a fairly sizeable minority of 
the families affected by cerebral palsy I interviewed – 16 per cent – as directly causing or 
worsening the patient’s condition. In 13 of these cases, families attributed the condition 
directly to doctor negligence, such as mistakes made during delivery or a delay in action that 
could have prevented the condition. In the remaining three cases, interventions to manage 
other conditions – such as an injection given to bring down a high fever or a blood transfusion 
– were cited as direct causes of the disability. Although only two of the 82 people I spoke to 
with sight impairments likewise referred to medical negligence – suggesting that different 
kinds of impairments are seen as having different causes, and that medical negligence is more 
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likely to produce particular conditions – there were also many people, across impairments, 
who complained that treatment had resulted in few if any benefits or had made the situation 
worse. Official discourses framed medical intervention as unequivocally positive and all 
encompassing, bracketing out wider social causes of impairments and potentially negative 
consequences of treatments. Those working to improve their own or their children’s 
impairments, by contrast, developed subtler interpretations. 
 Nevertheless, the poor and the uneducated, in contrast to how they were characterized, 
were usually very willing to seek medical interventions. Perceived medical negligence by one 
doctor, for example, spurred them on to find other, better ones, not to retreat elsewhere. 
Lower income groups were, however, confounded in doing so by a number of factors. Firstly, 
medical costs were prohibitive. A hospital consultation usually cost at least the equivalent of 
three days’ wages for a farm or factory labourer – and, even when treatments were offered by 
Government hospitals, the costs of x-rays, blood tests and other sundries were significant. 
Add to this the practical difficulties of accessing care – given that people, like the 
grandmother-grandson couple described earlier, often lived long distances from services and 
had other pressures on their time – it is difficult to see how health education, by itself, would 
lead to a significant upturn in people seeking biomedical treatment. 
 Even for middle-class informants, who often described themselves as in a worse 
position than the absolute poor because they had less recourse to government subsidies, 
balancing cost of treatment against the improvements that such treatment might bring were 
important considerations. Investing in expensive operations that might allow increased 
mobility for the patient, for example, were considered, by several families I worked with, only 
worthwhile if they improved marriage prospects for daughters or employment prospects for 
sons. If they did not, they argued, limited resources would be better spent on further training 
for a healthy son or a larger dowry for a healthy daughter. At least the settled siblings might 
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then be in a position to care for their disabled siblings after their parents’ demise.  An 
operation with minimal practical impact, by contrast, might leave them all in penury. 
Venkatesh, for example, a small business man whose youngest daughter was severely affected 
by cerebral palsy, was determined not to spend money on treatment that would be anything 
less than transformatory. ‘Unless it meant that she would be able to marry, go for education 
and get a job, how can I justify the expenditure?’ he said candidly as he walked with me to the 
bus stop after a lengthy interview with his family. ‘I have three other daughters to get married. 
If all our savings go on my youngest daughter’s treatment and she doesn’t get better, it’s not a 
good investment.’ The value that medical treatment might bring to life, then, cannot be 
measured simply in terms of the alleviation of physical pain or the extension of physical 
capacities: value is socially embedded. Public education, then, would only be effective if it 
went hand-in-hand with more accessible treatment and provided people with a different range 
of choices. 
  As Farmer’s work on HIV also illustrated, however, ‘education’ is anyway not a 
panacea for changing attitudes, and might even make people less likely to receive treatment 
(2005:xxv), particularly when it is poor quality and, as is often the case, superficial and 
patronising (Allen & Parker 2011: 105-107). In relation to leprosy, for example, the 
biomedical fact that the disease is transmitted via respiration is probably more threatening 
than certain folk models of disease etiology (White 2002). Leprosy caused by karma, for 
example, is less feared because it carries no risk of contagion; leprosy caused by an air borne 
bacteria, in contrast, poses a more significant direct threat (see also Staples 2004:73; 
2007b:441; Gussow and Tracy 1970). Similarly, the knowledge that sight impairments were 
more common among the offspring of consanguineous marriages led to some of my 
informants fearing that they would be blamed for their children’s blindness, making them 
more likely to hide them away and less likely to obtain timely treatment.  
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 A further, linked problem concerning public health education about disability is that 
what biomedicine can offer is often extremely limited. Although the doctors I worked with 
had improved the lives of many of those they operated upon, cerebral palsy was not a curable 
disease in the same way, for example, as typhoid. Against what were perceived as such stark 
realities, education campaigns urging people to seek hospital consultations often raised 
expectations unrealistically. On several occasions, for example, wealthier families begged me 
to put them in contact with doctors in the US or in the UK, who, they erroneously assumed, 
would be able to take them beyond the care available in India.  
 
Conclusion  
I have attempted here to disentangle disability as framed by a hegemonic medical model of 
disability – within which having a different kind of body to the mainstream is a personal 
tragedy – from disability as it is experienced by various stakeholders on the ground, 
intricately caught up in social and political structures and informed by the knowledge that 
biomedicine is not the only nor always the best framework through which to make sense of 
and manage bodily differences.  
The ‘world-making’ (Goodman 1978) practices of biomedicine help to shore up and 
reproduce a relatively stable worldview that continues to dominate the public agenda on 
disability in India. Responsibility for ill-health, disability and even poverty, is consequently 
located not within the wider political and economic structures over which biomedicine has no 
direct influence, but within ill and disabled people and their families. Critiques of biomedical 
knowledge – and with them wider discussions about structural inequalities, inadequate living 
conditions, and the absence or lack of access to medical treatment – are successfully 
bracketed, presenting public health education as a self-evident solution. The lay public is 
complicit in upholding official ‘discourses of truth’, not only because of the genuine benefits 
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that biomedicine might bring, but because they deflect culpability for disabling conditions 
away from social institutions, and themselves as individuals, and on to the victim. Responses 
to disability, from this perspective, require no change to the status quo, just a shift in the 
behaviour of those careless enough to get themselves into such a position. For the able-
bodied, conceptualising the disabled and the sick as a feckless other, captivated by 
superstition and outmoded practices, allows them to distinguish themselves as modern and 
stake claims of social superiority (see Pigg 1996; 1997). It is against this background that my 
interviewees framed their first level discussion of disability in terms of carelessness, a lack of 
awareness or education, and of superstition and tradition. At the same time, however, despite 
the lack of a coherent framework through which dissidence from these hegemonic views 
might be expressed, on closer inspection alternative perspectives on the causes of disability 
did emerge, suggesting that, in a context where most people had limited access to 
technologies of self-care, there were significant discrepancies between public rhetoric and a 
more nuanced understanding of the structural constraints that particular disabled people and 
their families lived under. It was not, however, simply that the lay public were more 
sympathetic to the constraints facing disabled people than their rhetoric implied: the poor, 
contra stereotype, were also less resistant to biomedical solutions than their affluent peers, 
and were usually keen to access medical support when socio-economic circumstances 
permitted. Against such a background, calls for more public health education will continue to 
fail to miss their intended targets.  
 
Notes 
1 Castes are generally defined as Hindu, birth-ascribed, endogamous social categories, 
organised into contested hierarchies, ranging from what, from a top-down perspective, are 
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identified as the ritually impure ex-untouchable castes to the warrior Kshatriya and priestly 
Brahmin castes.  
2 State reclassifications of caste groups previously labelled as ‘untouchables’ as Scheduled 
Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) had been expanded to include Other Backward Castes 
(OBC) – those considered economically and socially backward, despite ranking higher in a 
model of caste predicated in relative purity or impurity (cf. Dumont 1970) – and Other Castes 
(OC) for those remaining. Such classifications allow Government reservations of public 
sector jobs to be allocated to those considered most excluded. 
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